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Abstract
The wage led aggregate demand hypothesis is examined for the United Kingdom over
the period 1971 - 2007. Existing studies disagree on the aggregate demand regime
for the UK, and this appears to be due to differing empirical approaches. Studies
relying on equation-by-equation estimation procedures tend to find support for wage
led aggregate demand in the UK, while the single study using a multiple time series
estimation procedure finds no support for the hypothesis. We test the wage led ag-
gregate demand hypothesis in the UK using VAR models estimated on quarterly data
employing an alternative identification strategy based on shocks to real earnings. The
results provide support for the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis during the pe-
riod of study. However, the expansionary effects of higher earnings seem to be limited
and relatively short-lived.
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1 Introduction
The wage led aggregate demand hypothesis can be traced to the work of Micha l Kalecki
and Josef Steindl via Rowthorn (1981), Dutt (1984), and Bhaduri and Marglin (1990).
The theoretical framework supposes that total consumption is an increasing function of the
labour share, and total investment and net exports are decreasing functions of the labour
share. Depending on the relative strength of these distributive effects, an increase in the
labour share will either increase or decrease aggregate demand, and thereby gross domestic
product (GDP). The wage led aggregate demand hypothesis states that the distributive
effect on demand works in favour of wages: an increase in the labour share will lead to an
increase in GDP.
The interplay between the distribution of income and the level of aggregate demand
has been argued, by a number of prominent economists, to be of central importance in
rethinking macroeconomic theory in light of the 2008 crisis (e.g. Stiglitz 2011). The wage led
aggregate demand hypothesis itself has been influential in those policy-focused international
institutions broadly aligned with developing countries and the labour movement (UNCTAD
2010, Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012). However, a variety of estimation procedures and data
types have been used to test the hypothesis, and different studies often come to different
conclusions. This is particularly the case in the UK. Studies relying on equation-by-equation
estimation procedures, for example, tend to find support for wage led aggregate demand in
the UK. This is the case in Bowles and Boyer (1995), Naastepad and Storm (2007), Hein
and Vogel (2008), Onaran and Galanis (2014), and Obst and Onaran (2015). The single
study using a multiple time series estimation procedure, Stockhammer and Onaran (2004),
finds no support for the hypothesis.
This paper tests the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis in the UK using VAR mod-
els. Our approach implements an alternative identification strategy based on real earnings
shocks, rather than the labour share or total labour income. Modelling the labour share
directly almost forces the researcher to use identification restrictions based on the Bhaduri-
Marglin model (or some adaptation of it), which is the approach taken in the bulk of the
existing literature. Essentially, instead of identifying shocks to the labour share directly, we
estimate movements in the labour share indirectly, by estimating the responses of GDP and
total employment to shocks to real earnings.
Our focus in this paper is solely on short run changes in the functional income distribu-
tion, and we do not estimate long run relationships. This is, perhaps, the simplest approach
to the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis, although it runs counter to arguments made
in Blecker (2014). While we are not averse to the proposition that income distribution ef-
fects operate at low frequencies, it seems likely that the best way to approach this problem
empirically would be to employ multiple time series models that estimate both short-term
and long-term effects (such as error correction models), or via cross-country growth regres-
sions. The foregoing, in addition, explains why we refer to the wage led aggregate demand
hypothesis throughout the paper, rather than the wage led growth hypothesis as in Bhaduri
(2008), as the latter puts more stress on the long run than we do in the present paper.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the wage led aggregate
demand hypothesis in the context of movements in real earnings, rather than the labour
share, and compares this to the existing literature. With this background, section 3 discusses
our empirical approach. Section 4 discusses our data sources and variable definitions, and
section 5 presents the estimation results. Section 6 concludes, and discusses the implications
of our results for theory and policy.
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2 The Wage Led Aggregate Demand Hypothesis
Consider a general model of the business cycle, where the endogenous variables are consump-
tion (C), investment (I), net exports (X), and GDP (Y ). Assume that GDP is determined
by the aggregate demand identity, and the components of aggregate demand are functions
of GDP and the labour share (h), such that,
Y = C + I +X, (1)
C = C(Y, h), (2)
I = I(Y, h), (3)
X = X(Y, h), (4)
suppressing exogenous government spending. Therefore, the total derivative is given by,
dY
dh
=
(
∂C
∂h
+
∂I
∂h
+
∂X
∂h
)(
1− ∂C
∂Y
− ∂I
∂Y
− ∂X
∂Y
)−1
. (5)
Equation (5) summarises the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis. One usually assumes
that the second term in brackets is positive, that consumption is increasing in the labour
share, and that both investment and net exports are decreasing in the labour share. If the
positive effect of an increase in the labour share on consumption outweighs any negative
effects on investment and net exports, then the total effect on GDP will be positive.
There is a rather large literature testing the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis, the
bulk of which estimates equations of the form (2) - (4) on an equation-by-equation basis.
The studies that apply this method to UK data are Bowles and Boyer (1995), Naastepad
and Storm (2007), Hein and Vogel (2008), Stockhammer and Stehrer (2011), Onaran and
Galanis (2014), and Obst and Onaran (2015). All of these papers, apart from Stockhammer
and Stehrer (2011), find that aggregate demand in the UK is wage led. In a lot of this liter-
ature, however, potential problems arise from assuming that the labour share is exogenous.
While this is a legitimate procedure in a thought experiment of the sort described above,
it is potentially problematic when testing the theory. In particular, it is possible that the
assumption of exogenous regressors (that is, regressors that are not contemporaneously cor-
related with the error term) is not satisfied in a number of the existing equation-by-equation
empirical studies, giving rise to the possibility of endogeneity bias.
While the issue of endogeneity bias is often discussed in the empirical literature, it is
not often dealt with. Two possible solutions could be to estimate VAR models assuming
a reduced form specification: 1) in the components of aggregate demand and the labour
share; and 2) in GDP and the labour share, following the study of Barbosa-Filho and Taylor
(2006) for the USA. Unfortunately, in both cases identification problems arise. Specifically,
meaningful impulse response functions require orthogonal shock processes, and the notions
of orthogonal GDP and labour share shocks is just as problematic as treating the labour
share itself as exogenous.
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One notable solution to this conundrum is that of Stockhammer and Onaran (2004),
which estimates a structural VAR model based explicitly on Bhaduri and Marglin (1990).
This circumvents the problem of imagining orthogonal GDP and labour share shocks by an
appeal to a structural model with a large number of degrees of freedom. The authors find
that shocks to the functional distribution of income have essentially no effect on capacity
utilisation, and thus find no support for the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis. This is
an incongruous result made particularly worrying by the aforementioned estimation bias in
the group of studies that find that the UK is wage led.
As with Stockhammer and Onaran (2004), we estimate VAR models for the UK. Unlike
the latter, we take an indirect approach by disaggregating the labour share into real earnings,
total employment, and GDP. We are then left with a model in GDP (Y ), total employment
(L), and real earnings (w),
Y = Y (w,L), (6)
L = L(w, Y ), (7)
w = w(Y, L). (8)
Here, (6) is an aggregate demand curve, (7) is an employment curve, and (8) is an earnings
curve. While we expect the earnings curve to be increasing in both GDP and employment,
both ∂Y/∂w and ∂L/∂w are ambiguous. If the former is positive, then a positive shock
to the earnings curve increases aggregate demand. This case is illustrated in the left panel
of figure 1, which plots an upward sloping earnings curve and upward sloping aggregate
demand curve in (w, Y ) space.
Given the above, we take advantage of the fact that exogenous changes in the labour
share in the heterodox perspective are usually held to be driven by changes in workers’
bargaining power. This view is summarised in the following passage discussing policies
associated with the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis:
“Pro-labour policies . . . are often referred to as policies that strengthen the
welfare state, labour market institutions, labour unions, and the ability to engage
in collective bargaining (e.g., by extending the reach of bargaining agreements
to non-unionised firms). Pro-labour policies are also associated with increased
unemployment benefits, higher minimum wages and a higher minimum wage
relative to the median wage, as well as reductions in wage and salary dispersion”
(Lavoie and Stockhammer 2012).
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. CAPTION: Illustrating the wage led aggregate demand
hypothesis.
In light of this, we will interpret real earnings shocks as bargaining power shocks. We will
then consider the data to be consistent with the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis if
positive real earnings shocks lead to increases in both GDP and the labour share. This case
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is illustrated in the right panel of figure 1, under the assumption that the change in total
employment is non-negative and ∂w/∂Y = 0. Thus we take an indirect approach to testing
the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis, avoiding issues of endogeneity bias and the need
to construct orthogonal GDP and labour share shocks.
This approach is dissimilar to the existing literature testing the wage led aggregate
demand hypothesis, and may be compared to the econometric literature studying the rela-
tionship of real wages, output, and employment over the business cycle. Brandolini (1995)
provides a comprehensive survey of this literature up to the early 1990s. A notable recent
study is McFarlane et al (2014), which studies the business cycle co-movements of Cana-
dian wages, output, and employment, using the VAR methodology. In addition, we may
usefully compare our approach to the New Keynesian theories of real wages and aggregate
demand, where exogenous movements in the real wage can be driven by productivity shocks
as well as bargaining power shocks. An example is Balmaseda et al (2000), which finds that
positive real wage shocks increase aggregate demand, but these shocks are interpreted as
productivity shocks rather than bargaining power shocks.
While our approach is formally similar to the econometric literature surveyed in Bran-
dolini (1995) and the New Keynesian literature, it must be stressed that our goal is very
different. Unlike these literatures, we are not primarily concerned with the relationship be-
tween output and the real wage (or real earnings). Instead, we are primarily concerned with
the relationship between output and the labour share, and will only consider the data to be
consistent with the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis if positive real earnings shocks
lead to increases in both GDP and the labour share. This is not often a concern of the
aforementioned literatures, for which the functional distribution of income is not considered
important on the demand side, although there is an issue of observational equivalence to
bear in mind1. This is discussed with the data in section 4, after our empirical approach is
discussed in section 3.
3 Empirical Approach
As discussed in section 2, we model movements in real earnings rather than the labour share,
and follow Stockhammer and Onaran (2004) by estimating the following,
Azt = α +
p∑
i=1
Aizt−i + ut, (9)
zt = µ+
p∑
i=1
Cizt−i + t, (10)
where (9) is the structural model, and (10) is the reduced form. The vector zt contains GDP,
total employment, and real earnings, ut is a white noise vector process with ut ∼ N(0, I),
1Positive wage shocks in New Keynesian models usually reduce output on impact. Interestingly, however,
a weak wage led aggregate demand mechanism is incorporated into the Bank of England’s COMPASS model,
where a wage mark-up shock “temporarily increases labour income and consumption of [liquidity] constrained
households, which is sufficient to increase total consumption in the near term. This effect means that GDP
does not fall immediately” (Burgess et al 2013a, 2013b: B17). Also see Charpe and Ku¨hn (2015).
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and t is a white noise vector process with t ∼ N(0,Σ). This leads to an identification
problem: recovering A from the estimated reduced form (10). From (9) and (10) we have
t = A
−1ut, or At = ut. Expanding, we have:

a11 a12 a13
a21 a22 a23
a31 a32 a33


w
Y
L
 =

uw
uY
uL
 . (11)
We use a simple Cholesky decomposition to solve this problem. Specifically, we assume
a12 = a13 = a23 = 0, thus (11) reduces to,

a11 0 0
a21 a22 0
a31 a32 a33


w
Y
L
 =

uw
uY
uL
 . (12)
The restrictions embodied in (12) imply that real earnings do not react to GDP or
employment within the period, GDP reacts to real earnings but not employment within
the period, and employment reacts to both real earnings and GDP within the period. Real
earnings are the “most exogenous” variable in the system, which is consistent with the
Post Keynesian approach to wage led aggregate demand discussed above. This is the most
important assumption in (12), as we will be focusing on real earnings shocks, and it can be
justified by a number of arguments. First, it is well established that nominal wage and price
contracts are updated infrequently and set in advance of production (see e.g. Druant et al
(2012) and the list of references presented in that paper). In addition, the relevant output
and employment data are released with a lag, and are subject to substantial uncertainty
concerning future revision. Finally, wage setting is known to depend on a number of largely
non-economic considerations, including notions of fairness that evolve very slowly (Bewley
1999).
As stated in the introduction, we are only concerned with the short run effects of real
earnings shocks in the present paper, which we explore with impulse response functions using
the Cholesky decomposition described here. Note, however, that the VAR methodology that
we use does not impose any restrictions on the long run effects of shocks, and we report the
accumulated impulse response functions in section 5. In particular, it is important to point
out that we do not make any assumptions concerning a long run equilibrium labour share.
To do so, as pointed out in the introduction, would require an error correction model and
cointegration analysis.
4 Data
4.1 Sources
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE. CAPTION: NSA Real GDP, SA total employment, and NSA
real earnings series, four quarter log differences, 1972 - 2007.
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FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE. CAPTION: NSA GDP and NSA labour share approxima-
tion, four quarter log differences, 1972 - 2007.
As explained in sections 2 and 3, we estimate VARs in GDP, total employment, and real
earnings. The raw data are as follows: non-seasonally adjusted (NSA) quarterly nominal
GDP from the UK quarterly national accounts (code BKTL), seasonally adjusted (SA)
nominal GDP from the quarterly national accounts (code YBHA), NSA UK real (chain
value) GDP from the quarterly national accounts (code BKVT), SA UK real (chain value)
GDP from the quarterly national accounts (code ABMI), SA total employment from the
Labour Force Survey, NSA average weekly earnings from the ONS Employment and Earnings
publications (codes MD9M and KA46), and the NSA retail price index from the ONS
MM23 Consumer Price Indices publication (code CDKO). Only the GDP series are available
both SA and NSA; the historical earnings and price data are only available NSA, and the
employment data are only available SA (as the quarterly data are interpolated on an SA
basis prior to 1992). Note that the earnings series exclude incomes of the self-employed and
members of the armed forces.
Given the above, we construct two NSA real earnings series using average earnings
deflated by the retail price index and average earnings deflated by the NSA GDP deflator,
where the latter is given by the ratio of NSA nominal and NSA real GDP. We then seasonally
adjust these NSA real earnings series using the automated Census X-13 procedure in EViews,
which yields two SA real earnings series. We can then estimate four VARs in total: two
VARs using NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first
uses RPI deflated earnings, and the second uses GDP deflated earnings), and two VARs
using SA real GDP, SA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI
deflated earnings, and the second uses GDP deflated earnings). Thus we use SA and NSA
data, and two different earnings deflators, to increase the robustness of our results. All of the
series run from 1971 to 2014, although on inspection there appears to be a large structural
break in the real earnings series around 2008, which causes fairly serious problems for our
estimates. As our VARs require relatively long lag lengths (see below), testing for the
structural break is relatively difficult; after experimenting with different options, we chose
to limit our sample size to end at 2007Q4.
4.2 Unit Roots Tests
With respect to the SA data, three different unit root tests were employed to determine the
order of integration of the series: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test (ADF; Said and Dickey
1984); the Dickey–Fuller Generalized Least Squares test (DF-GLS; Elliot et al. 1996);
and the Modified Phillips-Perron test (M-PP; Ng and Perron 2001). We employed OLS-
detrended data as the autoregressive spectral estimation method in the M-PP test since,
according to Perron and Qu (2007), this method can be considered as a solution to the draw-
back that (for non-local alternatives) the power of the M-PP tests can be very small. The
highest lag order (lmax) selected to carry out the three tests was determined from the sample
size according to the method proposed by Schwert (1989): lmax =
[
12 (144/100)0.25
] ≈ 13.
We employed different methods to determine the optimal lag order in each test: the Schwarz
information criterion was employed for the ADF test, the general-to-specific procedure (Ng
and Perron 1995) was employed for the DF-GLS test, and the Modified Akaike Information
Criterion (Ng and Perron 2001) was employed for the M-PP test.
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Table A1 in the appendix reports the different linear unit root tests, which were carried
out including a constant and a trend as exogenous regressors for the different series. The
tests shows that it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 5% level
of significance in the majority of the log-levels of the series, and that the null hypothesis
is rejected when the first differences of the log-levels of the series are considered. Hence,
it is possible to conclude that the growth rates of the series can be characterised as I(0)
processes.
With respect to the NSA data, we employed the HEGY test for seasonal unit roots
(Hylleberg et al 1990), using the HEGY test add-in for EViews. This tests for unit roots
at seasonal frequencies, indicating how the data should be differenced (in order to prevent
over-differencing and the incorporation of artificial moving average components). The test
results are presented in Table A2 in the appendix. All tests were carried out including a
constant, a trend, and seasonal dummies as exogenous regressors for the different series. The
different tests show that none of the log-levels of the series can be considered as stationary
series since the null hypotheses that pi1 = 0, pi2 = 0 and pi3 = pi4 = 0 are not rejected (see
Hylleberg et al 1990)2. Likewise, it is possible to observe that the four-quarter differences of
the log-levels of series can be considered as stationary series since the null hypotheses that
pi1 = 0, pi2 = 0 and pi3 = pi4 = 0 are not rejected.
As discussed above, we estimate four VARs in total: two VARs using NSA real GDP,
NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI deflated earnings,
and the second uses GDP deflated earnings), and two VARs using SA real GDP, SA real
earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI deflated earnings, and the
second uses GDP deflated earnings). Given the results of the unit roots tests, all variables
in the first two VARs are in four quarter log differences, and all variables in the second two
VARs are in one quarter log differences.
4.3 Description
Figure 2 plots the four quarter log differences of NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA
total employment, from 1972 - 2007. While real earnings appear to be mildly pro-cyclical
and less volatile than GDP, total employment follows GDP with a considerable lag and is
much less volatile than GDP, even allowing for the interpolated data prior to 1992. The real
earnings series appear to differ slightly depending on the deflator used, with the differences
being most pronounced in the late 1970s and late 1990s. Figure 3 plots four quarter log
differences of NSA real GDP and the NSA labour share, where the latter is approximated
by the four quarter log difference of NSA real earnings plus the four quarter log difference
of SA total employment minus the four quarter log difference of NSA real GDP. This figure
illustrates the well known counter-cyclicality of the labour share, in contrast with the mild
pro-cyclicality of real earnings illustrated in figure 2.
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE. CAPTION: NSA real earnings and SA hours per person,
four quarter log differences, 1972 - 2007.
Two final points must be noted. First, the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis, as
we interpret it, requires a positive real earnings shock to increase both GDP and the labour
2There appears to be no non-seasonal unit root in the log-level of the GDP deflated earnings since the
null hypothesis that pi1 = 0 is rejected in this case. The slight ambiguities in the unit root tests should not
create too much doubt in the inference, however, as all series are expected to be non-stationary.
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share, which might appear inconsistent with the counter-cyclicality of the labour share at
first glance. However, all this implies is that shocks to real earnings that increase both
the labour share and GDP cannot be a significant source of fluctuations in either variable,
and the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis is thus perfectly consistent with a counter-
cyclical labour share. This conjecture, in fact, is supported by the variance decomposition
analyses presented in section 5. Second, average earnings are given by the average hourly
wage multiplied by average hours worked per person, and thus it is possible that the mild
pro-cyclicality of real earnings is driven in the main by pro-cyclical hours worked. Moreover,
a positive shock to real earnings could be interpreted as a positive shock to hours worked
per person, which does not support an interpretation of earnings shocks as bargaining power
shocks. However, we have good reason to believe that the bulk of fluctuations in average
weekly earnings are accounted for by fluctuations in the hourly wage. Figure 4 plots the
four quarter log difference of NSA average weekly earnings deflated by the RPI deflator and
the four quarter log difference of an estimate of SA weekly hours worked per person (total
weekly hours, LFS code YBUS, divided by total employment as above). The hours series
is considerably less volatile than the real earnings series over the majority of the sample,
and the contemporaneous correlation coefficient between the two series is negative and not
significantly different from zero at the 5% level. Thus we expect the bulk of fluctuations in
real earnings to be due to real wage fluctuations, and we do not expect positive shocks to
real earnings to be the result of increases in hours worked3.
5 Results
5.1 Reduced Form Estimates
As discussed in sections 2, 3 and 4, we estimate VAR models in GDP, total employment,
and real earnings. We estimate four reduced form VARs in total: two VARs using NSA
real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI deflated
earnings, and the second uses GDP deflated earnings), and two VARs using SA real GDP,
SA real earnings, and SA total employment (where the first uses RPI deflated earnings, and
the second uses GDP deflated earnings). All series in the first two VARs are in four quarter
log differences, and all series in the second two VARs are in one quarter log differences,
following the unit root tests described in section 4.
First, we estimate the two reduced form VARs with NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings,
and SA total employment, where the first uses RPI deflated earnings, and the second uses
GDP deflated earnings. The AIC lag length criteria for both the RPI deflator model and
the GDP deflator model indicate 10 lags, and 10 lags also results in reasonable statistics for
residual autocorrelation. Both models with 10 lags are stable, with all roots lying within
the unit circle. In addition, we cannot reject the null of homoskedasticity using the White
test for either model. Although the simple reduced form models appear to be well specified
in terms of residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, residual normality test results
are unsatisfactory. Bearing this in mind, we choose 10 lags for both reduced form VARs.
Detailed tables of results for the specification tests can be found in table B1 in the appendix.
3Our results are robust to replacing the weekly earnings series with an estimated hourly earnings series
constructed using the ONS hours data, although this reduces our ability to infer labour share movements
from the results.
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Second, we estimate the two reduced form VARs with SA real GDP, SA real earnings,
and SA total employment, where the first uses RPI deflated earnings, and the second uses
GDP deflated earnings. The AIC lag length criteria for both the RPI deflator model and
the GDP deflator model indicate 3 lags, but both models with 3 lags appear to suffer from
residual autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity. However, reasonable statistics for residual
autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity are achieved in models with 10 lags as before (al-
though the RPI deflator model suffers from heteroskedasticity problems even with 10 lags).
Both models with 10 lags are stable, with all roots lying within the unit circle. Finally, both
models again suffer from residual normality problems4. Bearing this in mind, we choose 10
lags for both reduced form VARs. Detailed tables of results for the specification tests can
be found in table B2 in the appendix.
FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE. CAPTION: Impulse response functions of GDP (top), em-
ployment (middle), earnings (bottom), to a positive real earnings shock, VARs with NSA
real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (four quarter log differences). Left
panel: RPI deflated earnings, right panel: GDP deflated earnings.
FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE. CAPTION: Impulse response functions of GDP (top), em-
ployment (middle), earnings (bottom), to a positive real earnings shock, VARs with SA real
GDP, SA real earnings, and SA total employment (one quarter log differences). Left panel:
RPI deflated earnings, right panel: GDP deflated earnings.
FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE. CAPTION: Accumulated impulse response functions of
GDP (top), employment (middle), earnings (bottom), to a positive real earnings shock,
VARs with NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (four quarter log
differences). Left panel: RPI deflated earnings, right panel: GDP deflated earnings.
FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE. CAPTION: Accumulated impulse response functions of
GDP (top), employment (middle), earnings (bottom), to a positive real earnings shock,
VARs with SA real GDP, SA real earnings, and SA total employment (one quarter log
differences). Left panel: RPI deflated earnings, right panel: GDP deflated earnings.
5.2 Impulse Response Functions
As discussed in section 3, we rely on Cholesky decompositions to isolate shocks to real
earnings. Figure 5 plots the impulse response functions and 95% confidence bands5, for
all three variables, for the models with NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total
employment. We plot the responses for the model with RPI deflated earnings in the left
three panels, and responses for the model with GDP deflated earnings in the right three
panels. It is immediately apparent that a positive real earnings shock causes an increase in
GDP on impact, and has no significant effect on total employment. The differences between
the two sets of impulse response functions are minor, with the obvious difference being the
larger effect of the real earnings shock on GDP in the model with GDP deflated earnings.
4We added dummy variables in previous specifications to deal with this problem, which was more suc-
cessful in the models with NSA data than with SA data. The results were not materially affected, however,
so the final specifications do not include dummy variables.
5All confidence bands shown in Figures 5 and 6 were computed using the bootstrap procedure in EViews
with 1000 repetitions.
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Aside from this, both sets of impulse response functions imply that the positive effect on
GDP growth of a real earnings shock declines to zero after a year, and that the effect on
total employment is negligible6.
Figure 6 plots the impulse response functions and 95% confidence bands, for all three
variables, for the models with SA real GDP, SA real earnings, and SA total employment.
Again, we plot the responses for the model with RPI deflated earnings in the left three
panels, and responses for the model with GDP deflated earnings in the right three panels.
As in the models with NSA data, a positive real earnings shock causes an increase in GDP
on impact, and has no significant effect on total employment. The differences between the
two sets of impulse response functions are minor, and the effects of a real earnings shock on
GDP at impact are similar to those in the models with NSA data. The largest difference
between the impulse response functions in the models with SA data and the models with
NSA data is the length of the effect: a positive real earnings shock appears to have a positive
effect on GDP that only lasts a single quarter in the models using SA data.
The conclusion that positive shocks to real earnings increase aggregate demand does not,
by itself, lead to the conclusion that the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis is supported.
As noted in section 2, we also require that the labour share increases in response to an
exogenous increase in real earnings. As total employment does not respond significantly
to real earnings shocks in figures 5 and 6, and the response of real earnings is uniformly
greater than the response of aggregate demand, then we can say with confidence that both
aggregate demand and the labour share increase in response to a real earnings shock in the
United Kingdom. At the mean, from figures 5 and 6, our results indicate that a 1% shock
to real earnings should increase the labour share by approximately 0.5% to 0.7%, and GDP
by approximately 0.3% to 0.5%. At the lower end of our 95% confidence bands, our results
indicate that a 1% shock to real earnings should increase the labour share by approximately
0.75% to 0.8%, and GDP by approximately 0.2% to 0.25%. Given this, we conclude that
the data are consistent with the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis.
However, the positive effect of a real earnings shock on GDP appears to be short lived.
Figures 7 and 8 plot the cumulated counterparts to the impulse response functions presented
in figures 5 and 6. One can observe that the permanent effects of a real earnings shock
on GDP and employment are positive but relatively small, and at the 5% level are not
significantly different from zero. Thus our results indicate that wage led aggregate demand
effects operate at relatively high frequencies.
Finally, it was noted in section 4 that the labour share is counter-cyclical, despite the
result that shocks to real earnings increase both GDP and the labour share. This implies that
shocks to real earnings cannot account for a significant proportion of GDP movements, which
is confirmed by the forecast error variance decompositions in table 1 for the VAR models
with NSA real GDP, NSA real earnings, and SA total employment (the decompositions for
the models with SA real GDP, SA real earnings, and SA total employment are similar). From
this table we can see that higher proportions of the variation in GDP can be explained by
real earnings shocks when using the GDP deflator. Shocks to real earnings explain at most
31.49% of the error in the forecast of GDP, corresponding to the first-quarter horizon when
the VAR is estimated using GDP deflated earnings. In the long run, real earnings shocks
explain less than 20% of the variation in GDP and total employment. These results support
our previous conjecture that shocks to real earnings explain a relatively small proportion of
the variance in GDP. Therefore, while positive real earnings shocks result in an increase in
6Note the labels in figures 5 - 8 are the EViews workfile labels; we have provided a table in appendix C to
facilitate comparison of the graphs and use of the workfile, which is available from the authors on request.
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Table 1: Forecast error variance decompositionsa
Forecast Horizon GDP Employment Earnings
VAR using RPI deflated earningsb
1 18.15 1.09 100.00
2 16.90 0.94 99.37
4 15.89 3.47 98.42
8 14.13 10.76 84.21
100 16.39 14.48 72.61
VAR using GDP deflated earningsb
1 31.49 3.74 100.00
2 28.72 4.39 97.84
4 21.53 6.85 97.34
8 18.92 11.50 92.51
100 17.41 13.22 84.28
Notes: aWe show the results of GDP, employment, and
real earnings to shocks in real earnings for the VAR
using NSA data; bPercentage points are shown.
both GDP and the labour share, these shocks do not account for a large proportion of GDP
movements, such that the observed labour share in the UK is countercyclical.
5.3 Robustness of Results
As discussed in section 3, we rely on Cholesky decompositions to draw our conclusions, and
the specific Cholesky decomposition chosen cannot be tested using the sample data. As a
result, it is important to check the robustness of the results to alternative decompositions.
For all of the data specifications used in this study, the conclusions remain the same for any
Cholesky decomposition in which earnings are ordered before GDP. However, the conclu-
sions are altered if a Cholesky decomposition is chosen in which earnings are ordered after
GDP. In these cases, there is no evidence of wage led aggregate demand, as GDP appears to
be unaffected by movements in earnings. The position of total employment in the decom-
position does not affect the conclusions. Finally, our results are robust to using generalised
impulse response functions rather than orthogonal impulse response functions.
Our results are not, therefore, completely robust to the choice of impulse response func-
tion. However, it is important to note that there are no possible Cholesky decompositions
in which an increase in real earnings leads to a statistically significant reduction in GDP
growth - an increase in earnings appears to have either a short-lived positive effect (in our
preferred specification) or zero effect. In addition, it appears to us to be much more rea-
sonable to assume that earnings are relatively slow moving in comparison to total output in
the UK, hence why we concentrate on the Cholesky decomposition described in section 3.
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6 Concluding Remarks
This paper starts with the observation that the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis has
been tested in the UK using a variety of estimation procedures. Studies relying on equation-
by-equation estimation procedures tend to find support for wage led aggregate demand in
the UK, while the single study using a multiple time series estimation procedure finds no
support for the hypothesis. We test the wage led aggregate demand hypothesis using VAR
models estimated on quarterly data employing an alternative identification strategy based
on real earnings shocks. The estimation results show that positive shocks to real earnings
increase both GDP and the labour share, indicating that aggregate demand in the UK is
wage led. However, the expansionary effects of higher earnings seem to be limited and
relatively short-lived by our estimates, and there is very little impact on total employment.
Finally, the results are not entirely robust to the choice of impulse response function.
One possible avenue for future research is to take a more expansive approach to the
effects of wage shocks on the major macroeconomic variables. This will require a treatment
of nominal wage and price inflation, which we do not provide in the present paper. A
second is to explore the link between employment and the labour share in more detail, which
might be amenable to direct estimation. Finally, one could estimate non-linear models to
investigate the effects of earnings or wage shocks at different stages of the business cycle.
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A Unit root tests
Table A1: Linear unit root tests on seasonally adjusted data
ADFa,b DF-GLSa,b M-PPa,b
Log-levels
GDP -3.36* -2.84* -19.84**
Employment -1.91 -2.36 -8.19
Earnings (RPI deflator) -1.62 -1.89 -7.05
Earnings (GDP deflator) -3.77** -2.54 -9.84
First differences of the log-levels
GDP -5.46** -3.87** -25.36***
Employment -3.08 -3.19** -18.25**
Earnings (RPI deflator) -4.11*** -5.58*** -48.70**
Earnings (GDP deflator) -3.73** -11.89*** -68.75***
Notes: aStatistics reported: ADF and DF-GLS=t-statistic; M-
PP=MZa-statistic; bCritical values used: ADF=MacKinnon (1996)
one-sided p-values; DF-GLS=Table 1 of Elliot et al. (1996); M-
PP=Table 1 of Ng and Perron (2001). *, **, and *** respectively
denote rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
significance levels.
Table A2: HEGY tests on non-seasonally adjusted data
pi1 = 0
a pi2 = 0
a pi3 = pi4 = 0
a
Log-levels
GDP -2.54 -0.94 3.07
Earnings (RPI deflator) 1.57 0.01 0.02
Earnings (GDP deflator) -3.61** -0.62 1.70
Four-quarter differences of the log-levels
GDP -4.08*** -6.21*** 49.34***
Employment -3.31* -4.26*** 33.14***
Earnings (RPI deflator) -4.49*** -3.86*** 32.86***
Earnings (GDP deflator) -4.76*** -3.84*** 25.29***
Notes: aP-values were obtained from Monte Carlo simulations
(2000 replications). Lag length selected according to the Akaike
information criterion. *, **, and *** respectively denote rejection
of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels.
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B Joint misspecification tests
Table B1: Misspecification tests over VAR models with NSA dataa
Autocorrelationb Heteroskedasticity Normality
Statistic p-value χ2 statistic p-value Statistic p-value
VAR using RPI deflated earnings
16.79 0.052 396.93 0.09 95.31 0
VAR using GDP deflated earnings
12.74 0.17 289.34 0.99 42.00 0
Notes: aTests employed: Serial correlation=Lagrange Mul-
tiplier; Heteroskedasticity=White (no cross terms); Normal-
ity=Cholesky of covariance (Lutkepohl); bWe only report the
results that test for first-order serial correlation.
Table B2: Misspecification tests over VAR models with SA dataa
Autocorrelationb Heteroskedasticity Normality
Statistic p-value χ2 statistic p-value Statistic p-value
VAR using RPI deflated earnings
7.45 0.59 426.42 0.009 30.79 0
VAR using GDP deflated earnings
8.32 0.50 367.81 0.38 31.63 0
Notes: aTests employed: Serial correlation=Lagrange Mul-
tiplier; Heteroskedasticity=White (no cross terms); Normal-
ity=Cholesky of covariance (Lutkepohl); bWe only report the
results that test for first-order serial correlation.
18
C Variable labels in EViews workfile
Table D1: Variable labels in EViews workfile and figures 5 - 8
Variable label Variable description
DLGDP NSA four quarter log difference of non seasonally adjusted
real GDP
DLWAGE RPI NSA four quarter log difference of non seasonally adjusted
real earnings, RPI deflator
DLWAGE GDP NSA four quarter log difference of non seasonally adjusted
real earnings, GDP deflator
DLEMP four quarter log difference of seasonally adjusted total
employment
DLGDP SA one quarter log difference of seasonally adjusted real
GDP
DLWAGE RPI SA one quarter log difference of seasonally adjusted real
earnings, RPI deflator
DLWAGE GDP SA one quarter log difference of seasonally adjusted real
earnings, RPI deflator
DLEMP1 one quarter log difference of seasonally adjusted total
employment
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